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1 Introduction
This paper explores whether and how strategic considerations influence the accu-
mulation of physical capital in the public sector. The analysis is motivated by
the fact that the stock and composition of physical capital at any point in time is
determined by decisions made in the past. Hence, when deciding how much and in
which projects to invest in the current period, an incumbent policymaker should
consider how these decisions will influence policy in the future. In particular,
incumbents may consider their perceived re-election probability when they make
investment decisions. We therefore test if variation in incumbents’ re-election prob-
ability affects the overall amount and composition of their investments in physical
capital.
Investigating public capital accumulation is interesting because it can provide
insight into what motivates policymakers’ decisions. In cornerstone studies Pers-
son and Svensson (1989) and Tabellini and Alesina (1990) show that how much
a government chooses to save in financial capital will be affected by its proba-
bility of remaining in office in the future.1 This effect, known as strategic debt
accumulation, is theoretically well understood as potential determinants of actual
policies.2 However, financial capital is not the only instrument for storing public
wealth. An alternative is physical capital, as emphasized by for instance Glazer
(1989) and Natvik (2009). We therefore empirically assess these theoretical stud-
ies’ key prediction that incumbents’ re-election probabilities influence how much
1Persson and Svensson (1989) show that the risk of being replaced motivates politicians who
favor a relatively small public sector to run excessively high deficits, while it motivates politicians
who favor a relatively large public sector to run excessively high surpluses. Tabellini and Alesina
(1990) argue that when voters disagree over the composition of government spending, any poli-
cymaker who expects to be replaced by someone with different preferences has an incentive for
excess debt accumulation.
2These theories are often given considerable attention both in general macroeconomic text-
books, such as Romer (2001), and in specialized textbooks on political economics, such as Persson
and Tabellini (2000). The empirical support for these theories is however mixed. Cross country
studies (e.g. Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991)) tend not to find any support for these
theories, while some studies of lower levels of government do (e.g. Crain and Tollison (1993),
Petterson-Lidbom (2001)).
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they choose to invest. In addition, we provide theoretical predictions on how the
composition of public investment will respond to variation in re-election probabil-
ities, and explore these empirically. We contrast the responses of investment to
those of current expenditure.
In our analysis we use panel data for Norwegian local governments covering
a period of 28 years, where elections are held simultaneously every fourth year.
Norwegian local governments are well-suited for our purpose since they operate
within the same institutional environment, facilitating comparison in the cross-
section and over time, and because they have large discretion in investment policy
compared to other OECD countries (Rattsø, 2003).
We exploit a unique feature of the Norwegian institutional setting to obtain
exogenous variation in re-election probabilities: National elections are held ex-
actly in the middle of the local election term.3 These national elections provide
information on the incumbents’ popularity in each municipality separately, and
we are free to choose the level of aggregation at which we use this information.
This allows us to address the reverse causality problem inherent in any approach
to analyze how popularity influences policy: We instrument the result of the na-
tional election held in each municipality i by the result from the same election
held in all other municipalities of the county to which i belongs. In this manner
we capture swings in voters’ ideological sentiment unrelated to local politics. The
identifying assumption is that the county-wide result from the national election
does not influence local policy except through its impact on perceived re-election
probabilities.
Empirical studies on strategic debt accumulation have primarily relied on his-
3The ability of the incumbent government to call an early election is a common feature of
most political systems. Among the OECD countries, only Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the
United States have exogenous election terms at the national level. In other OECD countries
early elections can be held if the incumbent government wishes to do so and the occurrence of
an early election is prevalent (Heckelman and Berument, 1998). Norway is, as far as we know,
the only OECD country that also has regularly scheduled elections at the local level that differs
from the national election cycle.
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torical measures of political stability to proxy for re-election probabilities (e.g.
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), Crain and Tollison (1993), Petterson-
Lidbom (2001)).4 Similarly, Darby, Li, and Muscatelli (2004), rely on electoral
volatility at the previous election in their study of political uncertainty and public
investments in a panel of European countries. The validity of these identification
strategies hinges on the assumption that (historically) instable units are similar
to stable units in all other respects relevant for politics (given control variables).
Our approach, based on changes in re-election within election periods, does not
rely upon this strong assumption.
Our main finding is that public investments do respond to changes in re-election
probabilities. We find that incumbents raise total investment when their re-election
probability increases. We also find qualitative differences between incumbents of
different party affiliation, as left-bloc incumbents increase investments in child-care
only, while right-bloc incumbents tend to raise investment in education and elderly
care when their re-election probability goes up. In light of the existing evidence
on party preferences in Scandinavia (Sørensen (1995), Borge and Sørensen (2002),
Svaleryd (2009))), our analysis indicates that when re-election becomes more likely,
incumbents increase investment in the purposes they prefer more strongly than
their competitors for office. In contrast, we find no such responses for current
expenditure.
Importantly, these findings allow us to distinguish between existing theories on
public sector capital accumulation. Frameworks where public capital is equivalent
to a durable version of a public good, as in Glazer (1989) and Beetsma and van der
Ploeg (2007), predict that incumbents will increase total investment and tilt the
composition of investment toward their most preferred purposes if re-election be-
comes less likely. Our findings are the opposite. A framework where capital is an
input that must be combined with flow variables (i.e. labor) in order to produce
4An exception is Lambertini (2004) that relies on opinion polls.
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public goods, as in Natvik (2009), yields predictions that are consistent with both
the level and composition effects we find in the data. When capital is complemen-
tary to flow variables in government production, the expectation of losing influence
in the future makes an incumbent hold back on investment since the capital he
purchases will be inefficiently combined with complementary inputs in the future.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a theoretical
framework based on Natvik (2009) which motivates the empirical analysis. Section
3 presents the data and the institutional setting. In section 4 we present our
empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 explores the
robustness of our results along various dimensions and examines the validity of
our identifying assumption. Section 7 discusses our findings in relation to the
theory presented in Section 2. Section 8 concludes.
2 Theory
Using the framework proposed in Natvik (2009), we here provide a theoretical ar-
gument why re-election probabilities may influence public investment.6 We repro-
duce the prediction of Natvik (2009) regarding how anticipated turnover influences
the aggregate level of public investment, and in addition we assess how re-election
probabilities are likely to affect the composition of investment.
5While we focus on theories where public capital is heterogenous, and where the political
agents do not agree about the relative value of different capital types, several recent studies have
analyzed public investment in capital that is homogenous. Besley and Coate (1998) and Azzi-
monti (2009) both consider public capital as an input in private production, which makes current
investments influence future tax revenues. Bassetto and Sargent (2006) study the incentives for
public investments in goods that benefit not only today’s voters, but also individuals who are
not old enough to vote. Battaglini and Coate (2007, 2008) consider investment as providing a
public good that benefits all citizens, and contrast it to pork-barrel projects targeted at specific
groups. Our analysis is not constructed to test these studies directly, but our results do support
the general idea that public investments are influenced by strategic considerations.
6This model is an extension of that in Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Alesina and Tabellini
(1990), where political agents disagree over which goods and services government should provide.
The extension is that these goods cannot simply be purchased at fixed prices, but must be
produced using labor and publicly owned capital.
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2.1 The Model
There are two periods, t = {1, 2}, and two parties, J = {R,L}. Each period a
party J is in office and decides how to spend one unit of income in order to produce
two goods f and g with the production functions
ht = h(n
h
t , k
h
t ) =
(
γn
h ε−1
ε
t + (1− γ) k
h ε−1
ε
t
) ε
ε−1
, (1)
where nht and k
h
t are labor and capital used in period t to produce good h, h = g, f .
ε is the elasticity of substitution between the two input factors in production. The
supplies of capital and labor to the public sector are infinitely elastic at the unit
cost 1. While the amount of labor employed is freely chosen each period, capital is
chosen one period in advance and specific to the production of each public good.
Hence kh2 is set in period 1.
In the first period the public sector’s budget constraint is
ng1 + n
f
1 + k
g
2 + k
f
2 = (1− δ)
(
kg1 + k
f
1
)
+ 1 + b, (2)
where δ is the depreciation rate of public capital and b is debt accumulated in that
period. In period 2, no investments are undertaken and the budget constraint is
ng2 + n
f
2 = 1− b. (3)
The gross interest rate on bonds is exogenous and equal to 1, which also is the
inverse of politicians’ discount factor.7 Obviously, (3) builds on the assumption
that debt is always honored, and implies that b ∈ [−1, 1]. This budget constraint
also implies that public capital is irreversible for the period 2 decision-maker as
he cannot liquidate it.
In period 1 the empowered party chooses
{
ng1, n
f
1 , k
g
2, k
f
2 , b
}
. The party in office
7We can think of the interest rate on b as determined on the world market.
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in period 2 sets
{
ng2, n
f
2
}
. Party J ’s preferences are given byW J = E
∑2
t=1 u
(
gt, ft|α
J
)
,
where
u
(
gt, ft|α
J
)
=
[(
αJg
φ−1
φ
t +
(
1− αJ
)
f
φ−1
φ
t
) φ
φ−1
]1−1/σ
1− 1/σ
. (4)
Here σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for efficiency units of public
goods, while φ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between goods g and
f .8 Hence, φ indicates the willingness of politicians to alter the composition of
public goods in response to changes in their relative production costs. E (·) is the
expectations operator, reflecting that there is uncertainty about who is in charge
next period. Before period 2 an election is held over which party is to be in office
in that period. With probability pR party R wins, with probability 1 − pR party
L wins.
2.2 Political Equilibrium
The equilibrium objects of this economy are
{
ng1, n
f
1 , k
g
2, k
f
2 , b
}
and
{
ng2, n
f
2
}
. Since
first period choices are contingent on second period reactions, the model is solved
by backward induction.
2.2.1 The Second Period
In period 2 the office holder, identified by αJ2 , allocates labor to production of each
good. This party’s problem is
max
ng
2
,nf
2
u
(
gt, ft|α
J
2
)
8An efficiency unit of public goods is
(
αJg
φ−1
φ
t +
(
1− αJ
)
f
φ−1
φ
t
) φ
φ−1
.
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subject to (1), and (3). Ignoring the specific functional forms in (1) and (4) to
preserve space, we may write the first-order condition as
ug
(
g2, f2|α
J
2
)
gn (n
g
2, k
g
2) = uf
(
g2, f2|α
J
2
)
fn(n
f
2 , k
f
2 ) (5)
Together with the budget constraint (3), this equation implicitly defines the equi-
librium choices ng∗2 and n
f∗
2 as functions of α
J
2 , b, k
g
2 and k
f
2 . Define these functions
as
ng∗2 = G
(
αJ2 , b, k
g
2, k
f
2
)
(6)
nf∗2 = F
(
αJ2 , b, k
g
2, k
f
2
)
. (7)
Under mild restrictions, discussed in Natvik (2009), these reaction functions have
the intuitive properties GαJ
2
= −FαJ
2
> 0 and Gb = −1− Fb ǫ 〈0, 1〉. On the other
hand, how labor responds to capital is ambiguous:
Gkg
2
= −Fkg
2
R 0⇔ ε R φ (8)
An equivalent condition holds for Fkf
2
= −Gkf
2
. The intuition here is that an
extra unit of capital has two opposing effects on second period labor demand. On
the one hand, an extra unit of kg2 increases the marginal productivity of labor in
producing g2, and more strongly so the higher is the complementarity (the lower is
ε) between the two input factors in production. All else equal, this motivates the
second period policymaker to increase employment in the g-sector. On the other
hand, an extra unit of kg2 will raise the provision of g-goods relative to f -goods,
all else equal. When the policymaker views the two goods as imperfect substitutes
(φ < ∞) this motivates a shift of labor from g-production to f -production. Hence,
the use of labor in g-production increases with the amount of capital installed for
that purpose if and only if the degree to which kg2 substitutes for n
g
2 in production
(ε) is lower than the degree to which g2 substitutes for f2 in consumption (φ).
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2.2.2 The First Period
The first-period policymaker, identified by αJ1 , solves the following problem:
max
ng
1
,nf
1
,kg
2
,kf
2
,b
E
2∑
t=1
u
(
gt, ft|α
J
1
)
subject to the production technology summarized by (1), the budget constraint
(2) and the reaction functions (6) and (7). Thus, the office holder in period 1
internalizes how its investment choices will influence outcomes in period 2. The
first-order conditions for the solution to this problem are given in the appendix.
2.2.3 Model Solution and Parametrization
Because the model does not have a general closed-form solution, we solve it nu-
merically. Our procedure is to find the values of
{
ng1, n
f
1 , n
g
2, n
f
2 , k
g
2, k
f
2 , b
}
that
satisfy the first-order conditions (5) and (13)-(16) (in the appendix) and the bud-
get constraints.9 As a benchmark, we set the parameter values as displayed in
Table 1.
The choice of ε = 0.7 is motivated by evidence from estimated macro produc-
tion functions, such as Klump, McAdam, and Willman (2007) and Antra`s (2004).
We set σ equal to 1, which is a standard value for households’ intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution for private consumption in the macroeconomic literature (King
and Rebelo (1999)) and in line with recent estimates in finance (Vissing-Jørgensen
and Attanasio (2003)). For the intratemporal elasticity of substitution we have no
evidence to guide us, and we set φ to 0.5. Imposing such a low value of φ amounts
to assuming that politicians are relatively ”stubborn”, in the sense that they have
low willingness to let the composition of public goods respond to production costs
rather than what their utility weights αJ dictate.
9In order to solve the model, initial capital stocks
{
k
g
1
, k
f
1
}
must be specified. We set
{
k
g
1
, k
f
1
}
so that if pR = 1 it is optimal to choose k
h
2
= kh
1
for h = g, f . As shown in Natvik (2009), these
initial conditions for capital do not influence how anticipated turnover affects policy.
9
Importantly, σ, φ and ε are the parameters that determine the model’s quali-
tative predictions which we will explore empirically. We therefore explain the role
of these parameters below. The remaining parameters matter only quantitatively.
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2.3 Key Implications
The key questions that we wish to explore empirically regard the following: How
does the probability that an incumbent party is re-elected affect its spending on
current expenditure and investment?
We display the model’s answers to these questions in Figure 1. The figures are
plotted for an incumbent of type R. Since we study the case where party R is in
office in period 1, the probability of re-election is pR. In this numerical example
the incumbent party prefers goods of type g more strongly than its competitor
(αR = 0.6 while αL = 0.4). The plots display the respective variables’ percentage
point deviation from the value they take when pR = 0.
The figure gives us the following main predictions for how the re-election prob-
ability affects first period policies.
2.3.1 Investment
1. When the probability of re-election increases, an incumbent increases total
investments.
Intuition: The incumbent party (R in the example) understands that if it is
ousted from office, less labor will be employed to produce the good it prefers
relatively strongly (good g in the example). Thus, when capital and labor
complement each other, the return to investment in the incumbent’s most
10γ is set to 0.7, implying a labor share of about 65 percent if the government were cost
minimizing. This has approximately been the labor share of government production in the US
since World War II (Cavallo (2005)). The depreciation rate per election term, δ, is set to 0.2,
implying a yearly depreciation rate slightly below 5 percent, which is consistent with what Kamps
(2004) argues is empirically reasonable for public capital.
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preferred purpose is reduced by political turnover. The effect on capital
returns in the other purpose (f in the example) will of course go in the
opposite direction, but since the incumbent derives relatively low utility from
this good, that effect will not outweigh the first. Hence, the more likely an
incumbent is to remain in office, the higher will it value future public capital,
and the more will it invest. We will later refer to this effect as the ”aversion to
inefficient capital utilization”. The lower left plot of Figure 1 illustrates that
the essential assumption behind this prediction is sufficient complementarity
between capital and labor, i.e. that ε is small.
2. When the probability of re-election increases, an incumbent party raises
investment in its most preferred purpose relative to its less preferred purpose.
(Ig/If increases with pR, where I
h ≡ kh2 − (1− δ) k
h
1 )
Intuition: When ε is low, capital returns are highly sensitive to how labor is
allocated in the future, and it will therefore be important for the incumbent
how the capital it builds is combined with labor after the election. Hence,
the prospect of losing influence motivates the incumbent to invest more in
the project preferred strongly by its successor, as this is where capital will
be complemented by most labor. On the other hand, the impact of turnover
on the future labor allocation also implies that relatively less will be pro-
duced of the incumbent’s preferred good. To compensate for this effect,
the incumbent may tilt the investment composition toward its own favorite
projects as re-election becomes less likely. Finally there is a third mech-
anism: The incumbent’s composition of investment affects the successors’
allocation of labor. From expression (8) we know that when φ < ε, it follows
that dnf2/dk
f
2 = −dn
g
2/dk
f
2 < 0 and dn
f
2/dk
g
2 = −dn
g
2/dk
g
2 > 0. Hence, when
φ < ε the incumbent has an additional incentive to tilt the investment com-
position away from its own most-preferred purpose as re-election becomes
less likely. This is what occurs in the upper left plot of Figure 1. On the
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other hand, if φ > ε the investment composition is tilted toward good f
when pR increases, as we see in the upper right plot of Figure 1.
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We have here deliberately focused on the model’s predictions when capital and
labor are complements. The reason is that this both seems empirically relevant,
for instance due to the macro evidence mentioned above, and because allowing
for this aspect is what makes our model substantially different from alternative
existing theories, primarily Glazer (1989) and Beetsma and van der Ploeg (2007).
These two studies analyze investment when public capital is equivalent to a durable
version of a public consumption good. This is analogous to assuming full substi-
tutability between capital and labor, which illuminates why these studies conclude
that anticipated turnover motivates higher total investment. They also imply a
composition effect where investment is tilted toward the incumbent’s most pre-
ferred purpose if turnover becomes more likely. Thus, the two predictions above
allow us to evaluate the empirical relevance of our framework relative to these
closely related alternatives.
2.3.2 Wage Expenditure (”Current Expenditure”)
1. The composition of wage expenditure across the two purposes is unaffected
by the probability of re-election.
Intuition: The employment composition (ng1/n
f
1) is determined by the ini-
tial capital stocks, as is evident from the first-order condition (13) in the
appendix. Because these are beyond an incumbent’s control, and because
wages are exogenous, it follows that the composition of wage spending is not
influenced by re-election probabilities.
As shown in the lower right panel of Figure 1, an incumbent may also adjust
11It is only when there is substantial complementarity between capital and labor that the
composition effect is qualitatively pinned down by whether φ is greater or smaller than ε. When
capital and labor are relatively easily substitutable (i.e. when ε is relatively high), the composi-
tion effect is no longer determined only by whether φ < ε or φ > ε.
12
the total level of wage spending to variation in the re-election probability. Wage
expenditure increases with the re-election probability when σ > 1, decreases when
σ < 1, and is unaffected when σ = 1.12 However, because the Norwegian munici-
palities we explore must balance current expenditure against income, as explained
below, we do not believe that this dimension of the model can be explored with
our data.
In this theoretical model the key difference between capital and labor is that
the latter is freely determined each period, while the former is not. Empirically
we distinguish between capital and current expenditures. Current expenditures
are dominated by wage expenditures. We believe that although these inputs may
not be completely flexible each period, they are considerably more flexible than
physical capital.
3 The Institutional Setting and Data
To investigate the empirical relevance of the theoretical framework laid out in the
previous section we utilize data from Norwegian local governments.
Norwegian local governments constitute a substantial part of the Norwegian
economy. Together with the regional level of government in Norway, the counties,
they account for about 15 to 20 percent of mainland GDP. Their main responsibili-
ties include child care, primary education and care for the elderly. In addition they
have the responsibility for some other services, such as culture and infrastructure.
The local governments face some regulations concerning coverage and standards
of welfare services, but have considerable discretion concerning the composition of
12On the one hand, turnover implies a ”substitution effect”: The incumbent will wish to shift
labor expenditure from the second period to the first period, as this allows it to spend more on
the purpose it prefers more strongly. On the other hand turnover implies an ”income effect”:
Politicians want to smooth the instantaneous utility flow from publicly provided goods over
time. Because turnover implies that in period 2 relatively little labor is allocated to the purpose
that the incumbent derives most utility from, the way to smooth the utility flow is to cut labor
expenditure in period 1 in favor of period 2. This income effect dominates the substitution effect
if σ < 1, while the substitution effect dominates if σ > 1. If σ = 1, the two effects cancel out.
13
expenditures. On the revenue side they are more restricted. The local public sec-
tor is largely financed by block grants and regulated income taxation. The income
tax rate cannot exceed a ceiling which is centrally determined, and since 1977 no
municipality has deviated from this upper bound. Furthermore, revenues from
income taxation are strongly equalized across governments in a rule based income
tax revenue sharing system. Grants are also largely determined by rules and reg-
ulations. 98− 99% of grants are non-discretionary, and the remaining grants are
primarily used to compensate for extraordinary events (like floods). The revenue
sources where local governments have some discretion, are user fees and property
taxation. For more details, see Rattsø (2003).
An important feature of the Norwegian system is that local governments are
free to deficit finance investment, but not current expenditures. The sum of current
expenditure and interest payments cannot exceed revenues.13
3.1 Data from Local Government Accounts
We will utilize data from the local governments’ accounts that allow us to distin-
guish between current expenditures and investment for different purposes. Our
data set covers 7 election terms, from 1972 to 1999. We do not use data after
1999 because of a reform in the organization of the account data in the following
election term. In the period we study, the number of local governments fell from
454 to 434.
We focus on the main welfare services that local governments are responsible
for: education, elderly care and child care.14 On average, spending on these three
13The punishment for violating this requirement is to be set under administration by the
central government, but this happens extremely rarely. Budgets and borrowing must, however, be
approved by the regional commissioner (fylkesmannen), the central government’s representative
in the county. If the balanced budget requirement is broken, the regional commissioner will act
to restore economic balance (Borge (2005)).
14In preliminary investigations we also analyzed the impact of changes in re-election proba-
bilities on other sectors, namely central administration, culture and infrastructure. We did not
find any impact of re-election probabilities on these expenditure types. This fits well with the
theory in section 2, since only spending on the purposes that parties disagree about should be
influenced by re-election probabilities.
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purposes together constitutes about 45 percent of total municipal spending. Local
governments are the main providers of these services. The public sector faces little
competition from the private sector, in particular for educational services. Almost
all pupils are enrolled in public primary schools.
Investment is defined as maintenance and spending on new buildings and struc-
tures (including wage expenditure etc. in relation to these) minus sales of buildings
and structures. On average, maintenance accounts for about 50 percent of invest-
ment, while sales amount to about 2.5 percent of investment. Current expenditure
is the sum of wages, equipment, external transfers and ”other current expendi-
tures”. Table 2 displays spending per capita for the different purposes based on
two-year averages. The descriptive statistics are based on the final data set that
we use in our empirical analysis.
In our sample, the average local government spends about NOK 11500 (approx.
USD 2000) per capita on the production of education services, elderly care and
child care each year. Current expenditures account for about 90 percent. The
coefficients of variation for investments on education, elderly care and child care
are 1.25, 2.29 and 2.28, which reflect that investments in welfare services are lumpy.
The corresponding coefficients of variation for current expenditures are 0.25, 0.80
and 0.99.
3.2 Political System
Each local government is ruled by a locally elected council, based on proportional
representation. Council members represent either political parties or local lists
formed outside the party structure. Most council members represent one of the 7
major parties that are dominant at both the local and the national arena.
The mayor is the key player in the local council, and elected by the local
council at the beginning of each election term. Under the New Local Government
Act, implemented in 1992, the mayor cannot be removed within an election term.
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Before 1992 some local governments had a practice where the mayor and the deputy
mayor swapped positions after two years (Gravdahl (1998)).
The Norwegian policy space is well represented by a single left-right dimension
(Strøm and Leipart (1993)). The main political divide goes between the left-
leaning socialist and the right-leaning conservative camp, and the political system
is dominated by these two blocs. The left bloc is strongly dominated by the Labor
Party, while the right bloc is more fragmented.15 The same parties are dominant
at both the national and the local level. At the local level parties sometimes form
joint lists, which are always from the same bloc in our data. In the average local
council, 41 percent represent one of the parties in the left bloc, or joint lists of
left-bloc parties, 52 percent represent right-bloc parties, or joint lists of right-bloc
parties, and 7 percent represent local lists which cannot immediately be categorized
as belonging to the left or right bloc.
We exclude local governments with one or more representatives from local lists.
We also exclude local governments before 1992 where the mayor and deputy mayor
were from different blocs.16
County and local government elections are held in September every fourth year.
National elections are also held every fourth year in September, but the electoral
cycle differs from the local elections with two years, i.e. national elections are held
exactly in the middle of two local elections. We will use this institutional feature
in our empirical strategy.
The system of representation into the national parliament largely mirrors the
system at the local level. Although local lists are sometimes formed at the national
election, their electoral support is in most cases negligible. Between 1973 and 1997
only two representatives got elected from local lists. We exclude local governments
15We classify representatives that belong to the Socialist Left Party, the Labor Party, Red
Electoral Alliance and the Communist Party as belonging to the left bloc.
16The total number of available observations is 2933. 1093 observations are excluded because
the local council has at least one representative from local lists. In sensitivity analysis we include
these observations in our sample.
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from these counties in the relevant election periods.17
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on political variables in our final sam-
ple. These are dummies for the mayors’ bloc (Mayor Left and Mayor Right),
share of votes to each bloc (Voteshare Left and Voteshare Right), support for the
incumbent mayor at the local (SupportLocalElection) and national elections (Sup-
portNationalElection), a dummy capturing whether the bloc of the incumbent is
in power also the next election period (ReElection), and finally the change in sup-
port for the bloc of the incumbent from the local election to the national election,
measured both at the local (∆Support) and county-wide levels (∆SupportCounty).
∆SupportCounty is key in our empirical strategy, and we elaborate on this in Section
4.
Given the theory presented in Section 2, it is instructive to know which welfare
services each bloc prefers more strongly, before we study how spending decisions
react to re-election probabilities. Sørensen (1995) and Borge and Sørensen (2002)
provide direct evidence on such partisan preferences, based on a survey where mu-
nicipality council members elected for the period from 1987 to 1991 were asked
which of the existing local government responsibilities deserved more or less re-
sources. The answers revealed that left-bloc representatives wanted to increase
spending on child care services and cut back on education relative to what right-
bloc representatives wanted. Right-bloc representatives wished to expand both
education and elderly care at the expense of child care.18 This pattern is consistent
with an ideological divide by which the left bloc is more concerned with stimulat-
ing female labor force participation than the right bloc, which values traditional
family life more strongly. Furthermore, Svaleryd (2009) documents a similar pat-
17We exclude local governments involved in mergers, secessions or border changes during an
electoral period, local governments that do not have proportional election systems and the cap-
ital, Oslo, which has a different institutional structure than other local governments. We also
exclude local governments with less than 1000 inhabitants. Finally, we lose a limited amount of
observations due to missing data from the local government accounts.
18In the survey the separate category stated was health care, not elderly care. However, elderly
care largely dominates this category in the accounts.
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tern in survey data of elected representatives in Swedish local councils from 1980
and 1993. In contrast to right-bloc politicians, left-bloc politicians ranked child
care as the most important spending category.19
In light of this evidence, disagreement between the two blocs seems most pro-
nounced for spending on child care relative to education and elderly care. Hence,
for composition-effects we would expect the strongest impact of re-election prob-
abilities to occur along this dimension in the data.
4 Empirical Strategy
To pin down how re-election probabilities affect policy-making we face three econo-
metric challenges. First, we are interested in estimating the impact of a variable,
the (perceived) re-election probability, which is inherently unobservable. Second,
this variable may be correlated with other local government characteristics that in-
fluence political outcomes (omitted variable problem). And third, the (perceived)
re-election probability may be a result, and not a cause, of political decisions
(reverse causality problem).
Our empirical strategy is based on the following conjecture: The share of votes
an incumbent bloc received when it was elected into office through the local elec-
tion in year t contains information about how likely that bloc is to be re-elected
through the local election in t+4. Similarly, the share of votes an incumbent bloc
receives in the national election in year t+ 2 also contains information about how
likely re-election is. Denote these two vote shares as Si,t and Si,t+2, respectively.
If our conjecture is correct, then a change in support within election period T ,
∆Si,T ≡ Si,t+2 − Si,t, indicates that an incumbent’s probability of being re-elected
has changed. Hence, we consider the results from the national election as a ”grand
19An alternative approach to identify party preferences is to apply a study actual expenditure
decisions with a regression discontinuity design, as in Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), Ferreira
and Gyourko (2009) and Petterson-Lidbom (2008). As our objective is not to reveal politicians’
preferences, such an analysis as beyond the scope of this paper.
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opinion poll” that captures ideological preferences of the electorate, while leaving
the composition of the local council unaffected. The national election is a par-
ticularly useful tool as it contains information from each municipality separately
and we can choose the level of aggregation at which we use this information. The
empirical relevance of this idea is evaluated in the next section.
With the above logic in mind, we aim to estimate the following relationship:
∆Y hi,T = ψ∆Si,T + τT + εi,T , (9)
where ∆ is the first-difference operator, and ∆Y hi,T is the change in spending on
purpose h from the two first years in election period T to the two last years in
that election period. We include election period fixed effects, τT , in order to allow
for election cycles unrelated to changes in re-election probabilities. These take out
national swings in partisan sentiment and other time effects.20 The key parameter
of our interest is ψ.
Note that with the specification in (9) our inference is based on changes in pol-
icymaking within election periods, and hence for given policymakers. A strength
of this approach is that all time-invariant factors are netted out. Unobserved
characteristics of the incumbents will not influence our results. However, an OLS
regression run directly on (9) is likely to suffer from an endogeneity problem:
Parliamentary election results may be correlated with preceding local political de-
cisions, i.e. Cov (∆Si,T , εi,T ) 6= 0. For instance, if a mayor is perceived as having
done a good job during his first two years in office, voters may be more inclined to
support his bloc at the national election. This generates an endogeneity problem if
spending is correlated with voters’ perception of incumbents’ performance. More
generally, omitted variables that influence both local priorities and voting will bias
OLS estimation of (9).
20Several studies have documented an election cycle in public policy, e.g. Drazen and Eslava
(2005), Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Dahlberg and Mo¨rk (2008), using data from Columbian,
Portuguese and Swedish local governments respectively.
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To address the endogeneity problem we use an instrumental variable approach.
Our instrument is the population-weighted average of the support for the incum-
bent’s bloc in all other municipalities in the county to which municipality i belongs.
This county-level information, denoted Scountyi,T , is calculated as follows:
∆Scountyi,T =
∑Ci
j 6=i popj,t∆Sj,T∑Ci
j 6=i popj,t
,
where Ci denotes the number of other municipalities in the county to which mu-
nicipality i belongs and popj,t is the population size of municipality j in year t.
Our first stage equation is given by
∆Si,T = ζ∆S
county
i,T + τT + ǫi,T , (10)
The idea behind this equation is that the change in support from the local election
result at the county level (Scountyi,t ) to the national election result at the county level
(Scountyi,t+2 ) two years later captures regional swings in partisan sentiment, which can
be treated as independent of local decisions. Our identifying assumption is that a
change in support for the incumbent’s bloc at the county level does not influence
the change in local decision making, except through its impact on perceived local
re-election probabilities. In sensitivity analyses this assumption will be closely
investigated. The idea that voter movements between parties to some extent is
due to general trends, independent of local politics, has also been utilized by
Svaleryd and Vlachos (2009) in a study of political rent seeking in Sweden.
We will estimate all equations separately for mayors from each of the two blocs.
Hence, changes in the composition of the national parliament cannot be driving
any results, as long as all incumbents from the same bloc are similarly affected.
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5 Results
5.1 The National Election and Re-election Probabilities
The central element in our empirical strategy is to consider the results of the na-
tional election for parliament as signals to local incumbents about their likelihood
of being re-elected. A key question is then: Does the national election provide
relevant information about the local incumbents’ re-election probability? To an-
swer this question, we run the following probit regressions that relate actual local
election outcomes in t + 4, denoted by Ri,t+4, to the incumbent blocs’ support at
the elections in t and t+ 2:
Ri,t+4 = ν1 + ω1Si,t + η1,i (11)
and
Ri,t+4 = ν2 + ω2Si,t + θSi,t+2 + η2,i. (12)
Here Ri,t+4 = 1 if the incumbent bloc is re-elected, while Ri,t+4 = 0 if the incumbent
bloc is not re-elected. If θ in (12) is different from zero, then the parliamentary
election brings new information to the incumbents about their support among
voters.
The results from regressions on (11) and (12) are provided in Table 4. The table
shows that the estimates of ω1 and θ are large and highly statistically significant,
while ω2 is not. Hence, while Si,t is a significant predictor of future re-election
before Si,t+2 is known, this is no longer the case once Si,t+2 is included in the
information set; the impact of Si,t is close to zero and statistically insignificant
when we control for Si,t+2. These results imply that a change in support from the
local to the national election, ∆Si,t, indicates a change in incumbents’ re-election
probability.
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5.2 The Effects of Changes in Re-election Probabilities
The results from the first stage regression, specified in (10), are reported in Table
(5). The excluded instrument, ∆Scountyi,t , is a strong predictor of ∆Si,t. The F-
statistics are 52 and 69 for the right and left blocs, respectively, indicating that
the instruments are relevant. A one percentage point increase in the support for
the bloc of the incumbent at the county level, translates into roughly 0.5 and 0.6
percentage points higher support for the right and left-bloc incumbents at the local
level, respectively.
Our results for investment are presented in Table 6 and for current expenditure
in Table 7. The results are obtained from separate regressions for each category
of public expenditure (education, elderly care and child care), as well as the ag-
gregates (i.e. the sum over the three categories). Each table presents results for
right-bloc incumbents in the upper panel and results for the left-bloc incumbents
in the lower panel. In order to facilitate interpretation, the dependent variable in
each regression is standardized by its standard deviation.
Table 6 shows that public investment varies with changes in incumbents’ sup-
port. For the right bloc, there is a positive aggregate effect that is statistically sig-
nificant at the five percent level. This seems to be driven by investment responses
in education and elderly care, although neither of these components’ responses are
significant at the five percent level when considered separately. Incumbents from
the left bloc, on the other hand, tend to raise investment in child care when their
re-election probability increases. This effect is statistically significant at the one
percent level. Because these incumbents do not adjust spending on elderly care
or education, which together dominate total spending, the aggregate investment
effect is not significantly different from zero.
Quantitatively, the results show that a 5 percentage point increase in the sup-
port of a right-bloc incumbent raises aggregate investment by 0.7 standard devi-
ations. Similarly, a 5 percentage points increase in the support of an incumbent
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from the left bloc increases investment in child care by 0.8 standard deviations.
A related study to ours is Darby, Li, and Muscatelli (2004). They document a
negative association between political instability and public investment in a panel
of European countries. While interesting, their approach cannot say much about
causality. Our analysis however, corroborates the general hypothesis that the
direction of causality runs from political instability to public investment.
From the theoretical studies of Glazer (1989) and Beetsma and van der Ploeg
(2007), a central prediction is that the less likely incumbents are to be re-elected,
the more will they invest. Our finding that investments tend to increase with
incumbents’ support contradicts this prediction. On the other hand, this finding
is more consistent with the theoretical predictions emphasized in Natvik (2009),
and displayed in the lower left plot of Figure 1. The essential mechanism in this
framework is that incumbents are averse to the inefficient capital utilization that
will follow if they lose influence to someone with different preferences for public
goods.
In light of the evidence in Sørensen (1995) and Borge and Sørensen (2002) on
party preferences, our results suggest that both left- and right-bloc incumbents
tend to tilt the composition of investment toward their most preferred welfare
service when their re-election probabilities increase. This tendency is strong for
left-bloc incumbents, who raise child care investments, while it is somewhat weaker
for incumbents from the right bloc who more strongly prefer education and elderly
care. Cast against theory, these findings are the opposite of what Glazer (1989)
and Beetsma and van der Ploeg (2007) predict. They are more consistent with
the theoretical prediction displayed in the upper left panel of Figure 1, which is
obtained under the restriction that the elasticity of substitution between public
goods in utility (φ) is lower than the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor in production (ε).
In contrast to the investment effects, Table 7 shows that current expenditures
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do not respond to variation in incumbents’ support. For all spending categories
considered the estimated effects are far from significant. While the absence of an
aggregate effect most likely is due to the balanced budget requirement, and thus
not informative on how re-election prospects shape policymakers’ choices, the lack
of a composition effect is more interesting. The balanced budget rule does not
prevent politicians from re-allocating current expenditure across purposes. That
politicians do not vary the composition here, while they do vary their investment
composition, is consistent with the specific theory presented above.
To clarify the role of our instrumental variable strategy, consider Table 8 and 9
that report OLS estimates from our second stage regression (specification (9))
without instrumenting ∆Support. The OLS specification indicate that public
investments do not vary with changes in re-election probabilities. For current
expenditures there are mostly negative associations between spending and support
for the incumbent.
A priori, it is not clear whether the OLS estimates are upward or downward
biased. The bias depends on the effect that spending has on the support for the
incumbent and the relationship between omitted variables and spending. However,
in comparison to the IV estimates, that correct for both sources of bias, OLS
estimates seem to be biased downwards. One plausible mechanism behind this
bias is that high spending early in the election period (all else equal) increases
incumbent mid-term popularity.
6 Sensitivity Checks
The results reported in the previous section capture the average causal effect of
changes in re-election probabilities on local decision making as long as the in-
strument we apply is valid. To investigate our benchmark results we conduct a
number of sensitivity checks. First, we include potentially relevant control vari-
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ables. Second, we investigate whether yardstick competition threatens the validity
of our exclusion restriction. Third, rather than excluding observations with coun-
cil members from local lists, we consider a different approach to handle these
observations.21
6.1 Control Variables
Our inference is based on changes in policymaking within election periods, and all
time-invariant factors are thus netted out. However, there may potentially be time-
varying factors that affect policymaking which could give rise to omitted variable
bias. For this to be the case, the omitted variables must affect not only local
politics, but also be correlated with county-wide swings in ideological sentiment,
which is our instrument.
Factors that reflect the need for welfare services is one class of variables that
may be correlated across local governments within counties and possibly also cor-
related with our instrument. To address this issue we control for variation in
demographics over time, namely the number of inhabitants (∆Pop), the share
of children (0-6 years) (∆Children), the share of young (7-15)(∆Y oung), the
share of elderly (67 years and older)(∆Elderly), the share of women (∆Women)
and the share of the female population (15 years and above) that are married
(∆MarriedWomen).22
On the revenue side, it is unlikely that changes in local economic conditions can
be driving any of the results presented above. The reason is that local revenues are
largely determined by non-discretionary grants and regulated income tax sharing.
However, as a robustness check we also include changes in the local unemployment
rate (∆Unemp) in our second stage.
21In a previous version of this study, we also varied the threshold population size below which
we exclude municipalities from our sample. This did not alter our main results in a substantial
way. See www.cesifo.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1 wp2709.pdf.
22Note that these variables may be endogenous due to Tiebout sorting and it is not obvious
that they belong in our second stage.
25
Table (10) and (11) report results from specifications where control variables
are included. The demographic variables mainly have the expected signs. We find
that an increased number of inhabitants in a particular age group is associated with
an increase in current expenditures in the relevant sector. E.g. when the share of
the population in school age increases, spending on schooling increases. Changes
in demographics are less important for investment. There is some evidence that
higher unemployment is associated with lower current expenditures. This might
work through the revenue side of the budget, but is more likely caused by increased
local demand for welfare benefits, which crowds out spending on other purposes.
Investment spending is largely unrelated to the local unemployment rate.
Importantly, our main results on the impact of re-election probabilities are
essentially unaltered when we include control variables.
6.2 Yardstick Competition
Voters may use information about political decisions in neighboring local gov-
ernments to evaluate the performance of their own government (Salmon (1987),
Besley and Case (1995)). Such yardstick competition is a potential problem in
our setting. If voters in local government i condition their voting at the national
election on the performance of their own local incumbent relative to the incumbent
in local government j, then the county-wide ideological sentiment (where votes in
i are excluded) may be endogenous to local decision making in i. This implies
that the exclusion restriction we impose, namely that the county-level change in
support for an incumbent does not affect his spending decisions except through
the local re-election probability, may not hold.
To investigate whether yardstick competition biases our IV estimates, we need
to exclude local governments that voters in local government i use as yardsticks.
Empirically, it is not obvious how this should be operationalized. We use two al-
ternative approaches to investigate the importance of yardstick competition. First,
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we exclude local governments where the county administration is located. These
”county capitals” are considerably larger than the average local government and
consequently get substantial weight when we generate our population-weighted
instrument.23 In addition, these local governments may be problematic because
the county population pays attention to the politics of the ”county capital” (due
to e.g. more media coverage). In Tables (12) and (13) we report results where
”county capitals” are excluded. The results are basically the same as before.
Our second approach is to rely on information on local labor market regions.
The labor market regions, 90 in total, are defined by Statistics Norway on the basis
of commuting flows across local government borders. In Tables (14) and (15), we
present results where the instrument is based on changes in the regional partisan
sentiment, excluding election results from local governments belonging to the same
labor market region.
As expected, the instruments become slightly weaker with the alternative in-
strument. The aggregate investment effect for right-bloc incumbents and the child
care effect for left-bloc incumbents is still statistically significant at the five percent
level.
Because results change little when we exclude local governments based on two
plausible definitions of ”neighborhood”, it seems unlikely that our main findings
are severely biased by yardstick competition.
6.3 Local Lists
7 percent of all representatives in the local councils of our sample belong to local
lists that do not participate in the national elections. For our key explanatory
variable, ∆Support, to correctly capture the change in bloc support from the local
to the national election, we need to know whether these local lists belong to either
the left or the right bloc. However, information that allows such a categorization
23The average population size of the ”county capitals” is 56.000.
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is not readily available. We therefore excluded municipalities with such council
members from the sample in our analysis above. The cost of this conservative
approach was that we excluded a substantial number of observations from our
analysis. In order to assess the importance of these exclusions for our results, we
here deal with the local lists in an alternative way.
The aim of the procedure we pursue is to avoid excluding observations with
mayors who represent parties that we know which bloc belongs to.24 In order to
measure change in support at the local level for the incumbent in municipality
i, ∆Si,T , we characterize all local lists as part of the right bloc. However, the
instrument, county-wide change in support ∆Scountyi,T , is constructed without mu-
nicipalities with council members from local lists, just as before. The idea is that
while the ad hoc categorization of local lists introduces noise in our measurement
of change in support at the local level, ∆Si,T , our instrument ∆S
county
i,T remains
unaffected by this source of measurement error. We thereafter conduct a similar
analysis with all local lists categorized as members of the left bloc.
Tables 16 and 17 display the results when local lists are included in the right
bloc. Tables 18 and 19 display the results when local lists are included in the
left bloc. As expected, the instrument becomes weaker when support for local
lists are included in either of the two blocs. However, the main results from
the previous analysis remain unchanged. For the right bloc the aggregate effect
remains significant, and still seems to be driven by elderly care and schooling,
while for the left bloc the effect on child care remains.
7 Discussion: Theory and the Results
The predictions from our theoretical model, taken from Natvik (2009), were deter-
mined by the specific parameter values for the production functions of the public
sector and utility function of the political parties competing for office. A way to
24We still exclude all observations with mayor from a local list, 4 percent of our observations.
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evaluate our theory is therefore to ask if there exist reasonable parameter values
under which its predictions are consistent with our empirical findings. At this
point, the most important finding is that incumbents tend to invest more when
re-election becomes more likely, which is consistent with the model under the as-
sumption that capital and labor are complements, i.e. when ε in the model is
low. Based on the existing evidence on macro production functions (e.g. Klump,
McAdam, and Willman (2007) and Antra`s (2004)) such a degree of complemen-
tarity is reasonable.
In terms of investment composition, our theory is consistent with the empirical
findings only if the political parties have a low intratemporal elasticity of substi-
tution (φ). For this parameter, we have no empirical evidence to lean on, and
hence our finding that higher re-election probabilities make incumbents tilt the
composition toward the purposes they prefer more strongly poses no strict test of
our model. However, cast against the predictions from Glazer (1989) and Beetsma
and van der Ploeg (2007), the composition effect in the data does point toward
our framework where capital and labor are complementary inputs to government
production.
While our empirical analysis was designed to explore the predictions of one
specific theory, the findings may also be used to evaluate alternative models. For
instance, one possible force behind strategic investments could be that incumbents
attempt to influence their own re-election probability. Two recent studies that
emphasize this mechanism are Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga (2007) and Drazen and
Eslava (2005). Both assume that public investments are particularly visible types
of public expenditure. Office-seeking incumbents will therefore invest more when
they need to boost their re-election probability, i.e. when electoral competition is
perceived as high. Our evidence does not support this prediction because a higher
support in the national election indicates a higher re-election probability, and thus
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less competition in the upcoming election.25 Of course, this does not rule out that
incumbents attempt to influence their re-election probabilities when choosing how
to invest. But, to the best of our knowledge, existing frameworks cannot explain
our findings as driven by endogenous voting.26
Finally, it is striking that re-election probabilities seem to affect the composi-
tion of investment, but not the composition of current expenditures. This finding
supports the general idea that the returns to investment are more sensitive to fu-
ture policy choices than is the case for current expenditure, as in a theory where
capital is a relatively inflexible input in producing public goods.
8 Conclusion
By studying highly comparable entities, municipalities in Norway, and utilizing
the overlapping regularity of local and national election terms that characterizes
this institutional setting, we have found that incumbent policymakers adjust their
investment policies in response to exogenous shifts in their support among voters.
Incumbents who experience increased popularity raise investment in the purposes
they prefer more strongly than their competitors for office.
This result is interesting for two broad reasons. First, it provides a finding
against which we can evaluate politico-economic hypotheses of public investment.
We have focused on theoretical frameworks where re-election probabilities are ex-
ogenous, and argued that our evidence rejects theories where the returns to public
capital are independent of other policy choices, as in Glazer (1989) and Beetsma
25The positive relationship we find between investment and support is therefore the opposite
of what both Aidt, Veiga, and Veiga (2007) and Drazen and Eslava (2005) predict.
26An alternative model of endogenous voting and public investment is that of Robinson and
Torvik (2005), where incumbents may choose to invest in socially inefficient projects (”white
elephants”) targeted to their core voters so as to raise their own re-election probability. While
this theory may well be relevant for developing countries (as the authors allude to), we do not
view our findings from Norway as consistent with it. The reason is that this theory would
predict incumbents to invest more in their most-preferred projects when electoral competition is
expected to be tough, which under the premise that a low re-election probability signals tougher
competition is the opposite of what we find.
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and van der Ploeg (2007). On the other hand, our evidence is consistent with a
framework where the returns to investment in public capital depend on the other
inputs that such capital must be combined with in order to produce public goods,
as in Natvik (2009). Hence, our results indicate that it is important to account for
complementarity between public capital and other inputs to public good provision
when analyzing public investment in a political equilibrium. Furthermore, while
we have not placed much emphasis on theories where incumbents choose the com-
position of investment so as to influence future voting, it may well be that such
considerations are important. We believe that our study motivates theoretical in-
vestigation into how politicians may choose investment strategies to boost their
likelihood of being re-elected.
Second, our results are important for normative considerations as well. A fea-
ture of democracies is that whoever is in government at a point in time faces the
risk of losing influence in the future. It is important to know whether and how
this feature affects which policies are actually implemented, since such knowledge
provides guidance as to whether democratically elected governments should face
restrictions on the set of policies they may implement. On this issue the literature
has traditionally emphasized deficit restrictions, as in Persson and Svensson (1989)
and Tabellini and Alesina (1990). For investment, emphasis has been on the ag-
gregate level of capital accumulation, with a central prescription being the ”golden
rule”, which states that investment in physical capital should be exempted from
deficit restrictions (e.g. Bassetto and Sargent (2006)). The institutional setting
in which Norwegian municipalities operate is very similar to such a ”golden rule”.
Hence, our results show that such a rule is not sufficient to prevent politicians from
varying the capital stock in response to altered prospects of re-election. Under-
standing the welfare consequences of such investment behavior seems an important
subject for future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 First Period Choices
For notational convenience, and without loss of generality, assume that the incum-
bent is of type R. Let hJ2 and n
h,J
2 denote the quantities of good h and labor use
for producing good h when party J is in office in period 2, and GJ denote the
reaction function of party J . The incumbent’s choices of
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in addition to the budget constraint (2). These are the first-order conditions for
labor hiring, debt accumulation, and investment in purpose g and f .
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Table 1: Parametrization
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
δ 0.2 φ 0.5 αR 0.6
ε 0.7 σ 1 αL 0.4
γ 0.7
Notes: δ is the depreciation rate of public capital during an election term. ε is the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor in the production of public goods. γ is the share
parameter of labor in the production function. φ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution
between goods g and f , and σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in the utility function.
αR and αL are party R and party L’s utility weights on good g.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Investment and Current Expenditures
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Investment Aggregate 1.138 1.242 -15.632 12.247
Investment Education 0.663 0.820 -5.198 9.017
Investment Elderly Care 0.396 0.901 -16.11 10.986
Investment Child Care 0.08 0.183 -1.409 3.2
Current Expenditures Aggregate 10.635 4.925 3.498 48.125
Current Expenditures Education 5.822 1.462 2.551 16.267
Current Expenditures Elderly Care 3.95 3.181 0.106 34.124
Current Expenditures Child Care 0.864 0.844 0 4.922
N 3446
Notes: Investment is defined as maintenance and spending on new buildings and structures
minus sales of buildings and structures. Current expenditure is the sum of wages, equipment,
external transfers and ’other current expenditures’. All figures are measured per capita in NOK
1000 and deflated to 1998 levels. Descriptive statistics are based on two-year averages. The
sample is restricted as in baseline estimations below.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Political Variables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Mayor Left 0.456 0.498 0 1 1723
Mayor Right 0.544 0.498 0 1 1723
Voteshare Left 0.449 0.146 0.062 0.832 1723
Voteshare Right 0.55 0.146 0.167 0.938 1723
SupportLocalElection 0.615 0.103 0.235 0.938 1723
SupportNationalElection 0.593 0.096 0.222 0.908 1723
ReElection 0.825 0.38 0 1 1706
∆Support -0.018 0.041 -0.243 0.192 1723
∆SupportCounty -0.005 0.025 -0.066 0.072 1723
Notes: SupportLocalElection is the incumbent bloc’s share of votes in the local election held at
the beginning of each local election period. SupportNationalElection is the incumbent bloc’s
share of votes in the parliamentary election held in the middle of the local election period.
ReElection is an indicator variable which equals one if the bloc of the incumbent remains in
power the next election period, zero otherwise. ∆Support is the change in support for the bloc
of the incumbent from the local election held in year t (SupportLocalElection) to the national
election held in year t+ 2 (SupportNationalElection). ∆SupportCounty is the
population-weighted average of ∆Support at the county level, excluding the local government
under study. The sample is restricted as in baseline estimations below.
Table 4: Information from Parliamentary Election
Right-wing Left-wing Right-wing Left-wing
SupportLocalElection 4.61*** 6.71*** 0.14 -0.23
(0.99) (1.63) (0.03) (-0.05)
SupportNationalElection 5.31*** 7.84***
(1.11) (1.81)
Constant -1.89*** -2.83*** -2.24*** -3.23***
N 929 777 929 777
pseudo R2 0.077 0.156 0.093 0.199
Estimation Method Probit Probit Probit Probit
Notes: SupportLocalElection is the incumbent bloc’s share of votes in the local election held
at the beginning of each local election period. SupportNationalElection is the incumbent bloc’s
share of votes in the parliamentary election held in the middle of the local election period. The
dependent variable is an indicator variable which equals one if the bloc of the incumbent remains
in power the next election period, zero otherwise. Regressions are run separately for mayors
from each bloc. The sample is restricted as in baseline estimations below. Marginal effects in
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: First Stage Regressions
Right-wing Mayors Left-wing Mayors
∆SupportCounty 0.48*** 0.60***
(0.07) (0.07)
N 937 786
R2 0.179 0.292
Estimation Method OLS OLS
Notes: The dependent variable, ∆Support, is the change in support for the bloc of the incumbent
from the local election held in year t to the national election held in year t+2. ∆SupportCounty is
the population-weighted average of ∆Support at the county level, excluding the local government
under study. Regressions are run separately for mayors from each bloc. Election period fixed
effects included in all specifications. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
Table 6: Effects of Increased Support for the Incumbents’ Bloc on Investment
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 13.90*** 9.59* 9.16* 2.85
(5.33) (5.31) (5.31) (5.31)
N 937 937 937 937
F-statistic from 1st. 52.45 52.45 52.45 52.45
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 5.86 1.22 3.45 16.58***
(4.28) (3.81) (4.52) (4.70)
N 786 786 786 786
F-statistic from 1st. 68.75 68.75 68.75 68.75
Notes: Each cell represents coefficients from IV regressions for each category of public expendi-
ture on changes in support for the bloc of the incumbent. The dependent variable is the change in
yearly spending from the two first years in each election period to the two last years in each elec-
tion period, scaled by the relevant standard deviation (from Table 2). The parameter estimates
measure spending responses if support were to increase from zero to 100 percent. The instrument
for ∆Support is the population-weighted average of the change in support for the incumbent’s
bloc at the county level, excluding the local government under study (∆SupportCounty). Regres-
sions are run separately for mayors from each bloc. Election period fixed effects included in all
specifications. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Effects of Increased Support for the Bloc of the Incumbent on Current
Expenditures
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 0.44 0.56 0.25 0.57
(0.66) (0.99) (0.82) (0.85)
N 937 937 937 937
F-statistic from 1st. 52.45 52.45 52.45 52.45
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 0.07 -0.03 0.40 -1.06
(0.60) (0.77) (0.84) (0.65)
N 786 786 786 786
F-statistic from 1st. 68.75 68.75 68.75 68.75
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
Table 8: Investment. Simple OLS.
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 1.81 1.89 0.55 0.17
(1.17) (1.21) (1.20) (1.23)
N 937 937 937 937
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support -1.46 -0.95 -1.28 0.01
(1.20) (1.09) (1.28) (1.21)
N 786 786 786 786
Notes: Each cell represents coefficients from OLS regressions for each category of public ex-
penditure on changes in support for the bloc of the incumbent. The dependent variable is the
change in yearly spending from the two first years in each election period to the two last years
in each election period, scaled by the relevant standard deviation (from Table 2). The parame-
ter estimates measure spending responses if support were to increase from zero to 100 percent.
Regressions are run separately for mayors from each bloc. Election period fixed effects included
in all specifications. Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Current Expenditures. Simple OLS.
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support -0.09 0.20 -0.08 -0.56***
(0.15) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19)
N 937 937 937 937
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support -0.67*** -0.36 -0.78*** -0.40**
(0.17) (0.22) (0.24) (0.18)
N 786 786 786 786
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 8
42
Table 10: Investment. Control Variables Included
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 14.07∗∗∗
(5.37)
9.37∗
(5.32)
9.41∗
(5.35)
4.02
(5.33)
∆Pop −0.14
(0.15)
−0.03
(0.14)
−0.13
(0.15)
−0.08
(0.15)
∆Children 11.42
(11.87)
12.56
(11.76)
−0.50
(11.82)
22.75∗
(11.79)
∆Y oung 15.52
(10.82)
30.71∗∗∗
(10.72)
−7.30
(10.77)
1.78
(10.74)
∆Elderly −8.36
(11.15)
6.84
(11.05)
−14.16
(11.10)
−12.90
(11.07)
∆Women −29.96∗
(16.38)
−8.52
(16.23)
−34.33∗∗
(16.31)
−25.89
(16.27)
∆MarriedWomen −5.78
(6.58)
−1.99
(6.52)
−2.24
(6.55)
−20.94∗∗∗
(6.54)
∆Unemp −4.73
(8.82)
−10.53
(8.73)
3.03
(8.78)
−1.54
(8.75)
N 937 937 937 937
F-statistic from 1st. 51.47 51.47 51.47 51.47
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 5.34
(4.22)
1.18
(3.79)
2.74
(4.46)
16.73∗∗∗
(4.66)
∆Pop 0.03
(0.19)
0.00
(0.17)
0.01
(0.21)
−0.05
(0.22)
∆Children 1.91
(13.58)
11.15
(12.19)
−9.28
(14.35)
14.74
(15.02)
∆Y oung −11.36
(11.89)
−5.06
(10.68)
−9.63
(12.57)
−4.72
(13.16)
∆Elderly 23.11∗
(12.49)
11.56
(11.21)
18.62
(13.20)
8.92
(13.81)
∆Women −48.70∗∗
(20.35)
−21.94
(18.28)
−48.69∗∗
(21.51)
−6.99
(22.51)
∆MarriedWomen 4.56
(7.05)
3.15
(6.33)
6.37
(7.45)
−19.66∗∗
(7.79)
∆Unemp 9.34
(7.67)
−1.25
(6.89)
13.93∗
(8.11)
1.57
(8.49)
N 786 786 786 786
F-statistic from 1st. 69.73 69.73 69.73 69.73
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
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Table 11: Current Expenditures. Control Variables Included
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 0.30
(0.66)
0.17
(0.97)
0.19
(0.82)
0.70
(0.86)
∆Pop −0.04∗∗
(0.02)
−0.03
(0.03)
−0.05∗∗
(0.02)
−0.01
(0.02)
∆Children −0.52
(1.45)
−6.49∗∗∗
(2.15)
1.27
(1.81)
3.35∗
(1.90)
∆Y oung 4.24∗∗∗
(1.33)
6.69∗∗∗
(1.96)
3.56∗∗
(1.65)
−0.20
(1.74)
∆Elderly 2.04
(1.37)
−2.16
(2.02)
4.80∗∗∗
(1.70)
−2.22
(1.79)
∆Women 1.96
(2.01)
2.17
(2.97)
2.73
(2.49)
−2.53
(2.63)
∆MarriedWomen 0.17
(0.81)
0.65
(1.19)
0.34
(1.00)
−1.48
(1.06)
∆Unemp −1.16
(1.08)
−3.72∗∗
(1.60)
0.31
(1.34)
−1.57
(1.41)
N 937 937 937 937
F-statistic from 1st. 51.47 51.47 51.47 51.47
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 0.14
(0.59)
−0.00
(0.75)
0.52
(0.82)
−1.13∗
(0.64)
∆Pop −0.05∗
(0.03)
−0.04
(0.03)
−0.05
(0.04)
−0.00
(0.03)
∆Children −2.10
(1.91)
−4.22∗
(2.42)
−0.78
(2.65)
−2.05
(2.06)
∆Y oung 1.86
(1.67)
7.59∗∗∗
(2.12)
0.17
(2.33)
−3.20∗
(1.81)
∆Elderly 3.60∗∗
(1.76)
−2.88
(2.23)
6.42∗∗∗
(2.44)
1.48
(1.90)
∆Women 1.54
(2.86)
−3.85
(3.63)
4.99
(3.98)
−3.27
(3.09)
∆MarriedWomen 0.58
(0.99)
−0.17
(1.26)
0.67
(1.38)
1.13
(1.07)
∆Unemp −3.90∗∗∗
(1.08)
−2.66∗
(1.37)
−3.72∗∗
(1.50)
−3.90∗∗∗
(1.17)
N 786 786 786 786
F-statistic from 1st. 69.73 69.73 69.73 69.73
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
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Table 12: Investment. County Administration Local Governments Excluded
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 12.29** 9.03* 8.22 -1.62
(5.28) (5.31) (5.28) (5.34)
N 891 891 891 891
F-statistic from 1st. 53.02 53.02 53.02 53.02
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 4.49 -0.78 3.51 16.15***
(4.00) (3.56) (4.31) (4.42)
N 749 749 749 749
F-statistic from 1st. 76.76 76.76 76.76 76.76
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
Table 13: Current Expenditures. County Administration Local Governments Ex-
cluded
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 0.68 0.48 0.51 1.10
(0.67) (0.99) (0.82) (0.87)
N 891 891 891 891
F-statistic from 1st. 53.02 53.02 53.02 53.02
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support -0.29 -0.12 -0.01 -1.42**
(0.57) (0.73) (0.79) (0.62)
N 749 749 749 749
F-statistic from 1st. 76.76 76.76 76.76 76.76
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
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Table 14: Investment. Local Governments Belonging to the Same Labor Market
Region Excluded from Instrument
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 12.08** 11.30* 5.51 0.39
(6.05) (6.17) (6.00) (6.10)
N 937 937 937 937
F-statistic from 1st. 39.05 39.05 39.05 39.05
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 8.25* 3.04 4.89 16.95***
(4.88) (4.30) (5.10) (5.28)
N 786 786 786 786
F-statistic from 1st. 53.87 53.87 53.87 53.87
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
Table 15: Current Expenditures. Local Governments Belonging to the Same Labor
Market Region Excluded from Instrument
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.48
(0.77) (1.14) (0.95) (0.98)
N 937 937 937 937
F-statistic from 1st. 39.05 39.05 39.05 39.05
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 0.21 0.38 0.47 -1.16
(0.68) (0.87) (0.94) (0.73)
N 786 786 786 786
F-statistic from 1st. 53.87 53.87 53.87 53.87
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
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Table 16: Investment. Representatives from Local Lists Included in Right Bloc
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 12.76** 8.28 8.44* 6.03
(5.18) (5.09) (4.65) (4.66)
N 1422 1422 1422 1422
F-statistic from 1st. 45.20 45.20 45.20 45.20
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support -0.40 1.28 -4.75 13.90***
(4.45) (4.33) (4.78) (4.87)
N 1079 1079 1079 1079
F-statistic from 1st. 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
Table 17: Current Expenditures. Representatives from Local Lists Included in
Right-Bloc
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support -0.05 0.24 -0.32 0.46
(0.55) (0.80) (0.70) (0.67)
N 1422 1422 1422 1422
F-statistic from 1st. 45.20 45.20 45.20 45.20
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support -0.23 -0.50 0.08 -0.72
(0.59) (0.83) (0.79) (0.78)
N 1079 1079 1079 1079
F-statistic from 1st. 33.99 33.99 33.99 33.99
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
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Table 18: Investment. Representatives from Local Lists Included in Left Bloc
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support 19.01* 12.33 12.58 8.98
(10.06) (8.66) (8.13) (7.62)
N 1422 1422 1422 1422
F-statistic from 1st. 6.56 6.56 6.56 6.56
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support -0.26 0.83 -3.10 9.06***
(2.89) (2.83) (3.10) (3.11)
N 1079 1079 1079 1079
F-statistic from 1st. 42.29 42.29 42.29 42.29
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
Table 19: Current Expenditures. Representatives from Local Lists Included in
Left Bloc
Right-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support -0.07 0.35 -0.47 0.69
(0.82) (1.19) (1.06) (1.04)
N 1422 1422 1422 1422
F-statistic from 1st. 6.56 6.56 6.56 6.56
Left-Bloc Mayors
Aggregate Education Elderly Care Child Care
∆Support -0.15 -0.33 0.05 -0.47
(0.38) (0.54) (0.52) (0.49)
N 1079 1079 1079 1079
F-statistic from 1st. 42.29 42.29 42.29 42.29
Notes: For explanatory details, see Table 6
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Figure 1: The Effect of Re-election Probability on Policy
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Notes: All plots show the percentage point difference from the corresponding outcomes when
turnover is certain (pR = 0). I
g and If denote investment in production of good g and f . Total
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labor in the production of both goods summed. Unless otherwise noted, parameter values take
the values in Table 1.
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